Simay Azadi English

Interview with Ehsan Aminroaya – Iran’s Future: The Third Option Explained

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Simay Azadi’s interview with Ehsan Amin-ol-Roaya, a member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

Introduction

The 12-day war, which ended with the ceasefire on June 24th, remains the most critical issue for Iran and the world. What are the key takeaways from this war as it pertains to Iran, the ruling regime, and the Iranian people?

Now that we are in a ceasefire period, where are events heading?

And what is the meaning of the Iranian Resistance’s policy—the “Third Option”—which was reiterated by its President-elect during the war?

Perhaps at no time in the past four decades have we faced such a sensitive and perilous moment in our country. We recall that at the beginning of this Iranian year, in March, the leader of the Resistance, Massoud Rajavi, clearly described this situation, stating, “We have entered the most important, sensitive, critical, and turbulent phase: the phase of final determination, where the fate of our people will be decided in their confrontation with the Velayat-e Faqih regime and its accomplices.” He added, “The multiplicity, intensity, and speed of events in this stormy sea are the hallmarks of a volatile revolutionary situation.”

We are now in the heart of these conditions. Speculation about the future is rampant. For this very reason, it is essential to focus on the perspective and policy of the Iranian Resistance, which will serve as a guide for action moving forward.

We will examine this topic in this week’s “Ertebat Mostaghim” program (live TV discussion).

Question 1: Let’s start with the 12-day war. What were the most significant results and effects of this war as they relate to the people of Iran and the nation’s destiny?

Ehsan Aminroaya:
You speak of destiny—the destiny and future of the Iranian people. While this is a fundamental and paramount issue in this conflict, it is also the question that received the clearest answer. Many of the political and tactical details of this war remain ambiguous and unresolved. But on this great question, a definitive answer emerged from the throes of a horrific experience.

What was proven—what became clear and is beyond doubt—is that destiny is shaped by the Iranian people themselves, by their sons and daughters, and by their Resistance, through their own suffering and struggle. Nothing else, nothing else, nothing else. No other factor, no other power, neither wants to nor can turn this dark, blood-soaked page in favor of the millions of oppressed people.

It was proven that war is not the answer to the Iran problem. It was proven that bombing cannot overthrow the regime. It was proven that the appeasing Western governments, which for years nursed a viper in their bosom—meaning they strengthened the regime and blocked the path to change—betrayed global peace. Twenty-one years ago, Maryam Rajavi told them loudly in the European Parliament that this appeasement would unleash war upon the world, but they did not listen.

And it was proven that those contemptible Iranian factions and individuals—and I don’t mean truly Iranian, but merely Persian-speaking—those phony reformists within the government who praised the Supreme Leader, who congratulated Khamenei on his warmongering in the region, and who opposed the regime’s overthrow, they betrayed the Iranian people and paved the way for this very war.

In contrast, it was proven that the only real solution is the Third Option, which the President-elect of the Resistance announced 21 years ago: change by the hands of the people and their organized Resistance. This means neither foreign war nor the appeasement policies of Western governments, but overthrow by the hands of the people and their Resistance.

Question 2: During the war, Mrs. Rajavi reiterated the Third Option in a speech at the European Parliament. She stated that the Iranian people welcome an end to the war and, in the first moments of the ceasefire, she welcomed it, saying, “The ceasefire and the end of the foreign war is an advancement for the Third Option.” What does this phrase mean?

Ehsan Aminroaya
War is not the arena for the people and their Resistance to play a role. War is an arena where governments and ruling powers take control, and the people’s ability to act is stripped away.

Consequently, war paves the way for anti-popular, dependent, and colonial alternatives—for those who have no substance or merit other than to ride into power on the tanks of foreign, occupying forces.

We have seen this in the experience of other countries, but we have also seen it in Iran’s own history. In 1921, when Reza Shah was brought to power, the situation was that British forces had occupied parts of Iran, and as they were preparing to withdraw, they shaped an alternative that suited their own interests, and we saw the result. Two decades before that, Tsarist Russian forces occupied Tabriz, captured Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan (leaders of Iran’s Constitutional Revolution), and prevented them from participating in the liberation of Tehran, effectively blocking the path for a popular alternative.

Wherever war and military solutions have receded, the Third Option has been genuinely strengthened.

Question 3: If you agree, let’s dissect the Third Option. What are its aspects? What are its foundations, and on what precedents in the positions of the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance is it built?

Ehsan Aminroaya
In terms of the PMOI’s core principles, the Third Option arises from this movement’s commitment to independence and self-reliance.

It is also built on our firm belief in and commitment to the slogan of “Peace and Freedom,” for which we have paid a heavy price in confronting Khomeini’s warmongering.

From a strategic standpoint, it is another expression of the principle of kas nakharad (“no one will scratch your back but yourself”); meaning, we fight the regime only by standing on our own feet and relying solely on the power of our people.

From a foreign policy perspective, as the leader of the Resistance has said, this solution is the continuation and historical legacy of Prime Minister Mossadegh’s strategy of “Negative Equilibrium” (a 1950s policy of national independence through non-alignment with any foreign superpower) as applied to the mullahs’ regime.

The Third Option follows Mossadegh’s policy of Negative Equilibrium, but with an active, not passive, interpretation: defending national independence and interests while maintaining active relations with the world, in a way that prioritizes the flourishing of popular sovereignty and Iran’s democratic, economic, and social development.

Historically, the Third Option is the same path that has manifested over the last hundred years in the Amirkhiz uprising in Tabriz (a key event in the Constitutional Revolution), in the heroes of Tangestan (early 20th-century anti-colonial fighters), in the Mojahedan-e Jangal (an early 20th-century freedom movement in northern Iran), and in the soldiers of the National Movement, all the way to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) in Ashraf.

At the same time, this solution’s absolute focus is on overthrowing the regime. That pursuit of independence, that Mossadeghist policy, that unwavering defense of peace and freedom—all of it necessitates a focus on overthrow.

Massoud Rajavi:
“Let me state, without a shred of exaggeration: We offer Maryam Rajavi’s solution to the international community, to America, and to Europe. This solution is not only desirable for us and our nation but is also a pressing need for them and their nations. It proposes peace, security, democracy, human rights, stability, reconstruction, friendship, a non-nuclear Iran, cooperation, and economic development in this region of the world, and it respects international laws and conventions.”

Question 4: Following up on that explanation, it would be good to pause on the meaning of this phrase again. What is the difference between simply saying, “We are against both the war and the regime,” and advocating for the “Third Option”?

Ehsan Aminroaya
To say “neither war, nor appeasement” and stop at those two “no’s” is a passive approach. It is neutral. And in politics, a neutral stance inevitably benefits the ruling regime.

“Neither war, nor appeasement” without specifying the agent and its driving force is neutral.

The same goes for “neither war, nor the ruling regime.” Without identifying the movement and the vanguard force that must bring these two “no’s” to fruition, nothing is set in motion.

But when we say the “Third Option,” we mean an active solution, we mean a movement and a revolution.

Those currents and individuals who consciously stop at just the first two parts, no matter how much they scream and posture, are demonstrating an escape from struggle and an opportunism.

I want to draw your attention to the fact that the Third Option, and the concise definition it provides, is a brilliant phrase that has highlighted the boundaries of the resistance, revolution, and freedom against the regime, its accomplices, and the reactionary bourgeoisie whose interests align with the regime’s against the people.

It is a phrase composed of these concepts, in this way:
It is a solution that is:
Not passive and neutral, but a standard-bearer for uprising and overthrow.
It rejects war and considers the main war to be that of the Iranian people against the regime.
It rejects dependency on foreigners, is an indicator of progressive nationalism, and relies on the people of Iran.
It rejects any notion of a spontaneous overthrow or collapse of the regime and is preparing to organize an uprising.
The nature of the transformation and change it seeks is democratic, not a royalist neo-fascism.
And at the same time, it demands overthrow, and in this way, it draws a line with the regime’s factions and gangs.

Question 5: Another question about the Third Option is whether this solution is just a viewpoint, an idea, and a proposal that the Iranian Resistance has offered to the international community, or has it been reflected in the practical policies of the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the NCRI? And if so, in what steps can we see this policy being implemented?

Ehsan Amin-ol Roaya
The Third Option is the concise theoretical expression of all the battles and political, social, and international activities of the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran from June 20, 1981, until now.
This phrase is, in fact, the outcome of the Mojahedin’s (PMOI/MEK) practical struggle.

“Neither appeasement, nor war, but democratic change by the hands of the people and the Iranian Resistance.”

To combat appeasement, the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance have waged a persistent and lengthy struggle. This includes a far-reaching political and legal battle to remove the Mojahedin’s (PMOI/MEK) name from the terrorist lists that Western governments had created at the regime’s request. In essence, at that juncture, Maryam Rajavi led a campaign to establish the Iranian people’s right to struggle against the regime, a right that had been denied by Western governments.
This campaign also includes garnering the support of majorities in dozens of parliaments around the world for the Iranian people’s aspiration for freedom.

Now we come to the phrase “no war” in the Third Option. This solution has been and is the antithesis of the war and warmongering of Khomeini and Khamenei. For 44 years, the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance have risen up against Khomeini’s warmongering with the slogan “Peace and Freedom,” specifically against Khomeini’s anti-patriotic war with Iraq, which killed one million Iranians.
After that, no party has opposed the regime’s warmongering in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq as much as the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK)and the Council. We have consistently fought against policies that create the grounds for and incite foreign war. The party that for years has popularized the slogan of “uprooting the regime’s influence” in the countries of the region has been these same Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK). Our persistent and long struggle against the regime’s warmongering in the region found its echo in Iranian society, and we heard it in the slogans of popular protests in the streets, where they said, “Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran.” But the traitorous reformists, in opposition, said, “Both Gaza and Lebanon.”

The Mojahedin’s (PMOI/MEK) long campaign against the anti-national project of nuclear bomb-making is part of these same activities.
The regime’s bomb-making was for the preservation and survival of a reactionary regime and against the supreme interests of Iran and the Iranian people. This project, from the beginning, put Iran in danger of war, and all those who supported the nuclear program were paving the way for bringing the fire of war to Iran.

Regarding the other important component of the Third Option—”democratic change by the hands of the people and the resistance”—
From the battles the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) waged against the regime in the early 1980s to the establishment of the National Liberation Army and its battles, to the Resistance Units that are now organized in all 31 provinces of the country, all have advanced this solution. That is, where it says “by the hands of the people and the Iranian Resistance.” The Resistance Units and the Liberation Army are the embodiment of the same strategy that the leader of the Resistance expresses with the term kas nakharad (“by one’s own hand”). Meaning, by the hands of the people themselves and their organized force, not any other hand.
The answer to this regime is a resistance that has sprung from the heart of Iranian society. It is not in a foreign attack; the answer to the regime’s missile cities is a rebellious city with rebellious youth.

Question 6: You referred to the policy and slogan of “Peace and Freedom” that the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance had in response to Khomeini’s eight-year war with Iraq. Since this relates to events from many years ago, it would be good to expand on this topic.

Ehsan Amin-ol Roaya
Yes, certainly. I’ll give a quick reminder. Of course we all know that Khomeini was the one provoking the war.  That eight-year war began in 1980.  In the early years of the war, the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and their supporters went to the fronts and participated in the war against the Iraqi forces. At that time, the Pasdaran and Khomeini’s agents continued to arrest and suppress the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) on those same fronts. But the Mojahedin  (PMOI/MEK) stood and fought on the war fronts, and a number of them were martyred. The most famous of them was Dr. Tabatabai, one of the heads of the Mojahedin’s medical relief in Tehran, who was martyred.
This continued until June 1982, when the Iraqi side evacuated Khorramshahr and called for a ceasefire and peace. From that date, the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance declared that this war was anti-patriotic and anti-people. This war, in which Khomeini sent Iranian nationals to their deaths by the thousands as disposable soldiers, is criminal.

I must emphasize that one of the greatest patriotic honors of the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance is their stand against that war, in which Khomeini killed one million Iranians. At that time, only the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) said no to that sinister war. Everyone else, including the reformists, the Freedom Movement, the Shah’s son, and generally the reactionary bourgeoisie whose interests aligned with the regime’s against the people, were beating their chests in defense of that war.

In the end, the party that also brought that war to a close was the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Liberation Army. After Operation Chelcheragh (Forty Lanterns), the capture of Mehran, and the seizure of two of the regime’s divisions, Khomeini, fearing a further offensive and advance by the National Liberation Army, reluctantly accepted the ceasefire and himself said he had “drunk the poison chalice.”

The greatest crime of the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance in the eyes of the mullahs is this: that they forced the poison chalice of the ceasefire down Khomeini’s throat. For this reason, for years and years, they have demonized the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK), branded them as a fifth column, and distributed a library of lies and accusations, but they find no solace.

Question 7: What effect has the Third Option, which the Iranian Resistance has championed for the past two decades, had on the regime’s policies, and what was its reaction?

Ehsan Amin-ol Roaya
In many areas, it created serious obstacles to the regime’s warmongering, including on the nuclear program. Therefore, the regime was always at war with the Third Option, fighting it inch by inch. I will limit myself to one example. In 2008, the Italian Senate supported the Third Option proposed by the President-elect of the Resistance. In response, the mullahs’ regime directed all sorts of pressure and threats at Italy. For example, it reduced its trade relations by 20%. It threatened to downgrade the level of its political relations. It began to buy a number of individuals to enlist them against the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran, and it also spent a lot of money on propaganda against the Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK). It even, through three specific countries, threatened Italy that supporting Ashraf (PMOI base in Iraq) and the Third Option would not be beneficial for the lives of Italian soldiers outside of Italy!

There are many such examples. But let me also add that the goal of the Third Option, more than anything else, is to mobilize the people’s front and its fighting force around the cause of struggle for change—that same overthrow and democratic change.

Question 8: Now I want to raise another question that is not directly about the Third Option but is not too far from this conversation we are having. You see, this war that occurred, despite its short duration, is an event with many consequences that will become more apparent from now on. But if we were to sum it up so far, what changes has it created in the alignment and polarization of political forces, meaning the forces outside the regime?

Ehsan Amin-ol Roaya
Well, perhaps it is still too soon to interpret the signs so far and to discern the orientations. However, despite the very short time that has passed, we can see two developments:

One, the royalist neo-fascism, which had brazenly invested in the idea that it would land in Iran with bombs and come to power, suffered a major political defeat. It received a firm slap in the face from Iran and from Iranian society, and this is an irreparable political fall that has brought it to the lowest point on its 46-year curve. Before the war, he was the son of the overthrown Shah who, by his own admission, had connections with the commanders of the IRGC and police. After the war, he has fallen to the position of an intelligence and security errand boy who has created a communication channel for the intelligence agents and guards.
I have seen on social media that some people are warning that this person is a source of dangerous security contaminations in the environment outside the country. In my opinion, this warning should be taken seriously.

The other development is that a number of these exported castoffs of the regime, or reformists assigned to duty outside the country, have engaged in some very useful unveilings and have shown their close ties with the regime. Before this, these people, with their airs and graces and Western-friendly vocabulary, passed themselves off as opponents of the regime. And of course, their rations and salaries were provided by “those who are better than us.” In this war, they suddenly pulled back the curtain and showed their true colors.
One of this ilk had given an interview to the French press and was singing such praises for the policies of “Dr. Araghchi.” Another one of them in America was moaning and groaning and worrying about, in his own words, Iran’s “defense and security structure.” What is the security and defense structure other than the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence, which are among the most important agents of slaughter, massacre, crime, and decline in Iran? Therefore, the development is that the color-changing castoffs have returned to their roots, and as the famous Iranian poet Saadi said, “A wolf’s cub will eventually become a wolf.” This is a trend that will continue from now on. The regime needs them too. Ali Larijani,  and advisor to Khamenei and former Majlis’s speaker, recently said: “Even the opposition outside the country was on our side in this matter.”

Question 9: Another question that is good to talk about is the why of the position the regime has found itself in. There is no doubt that the regime after the war is fundamentally different from before the war and has become much weaker, both politically and from a military standpoint. And there is no doubt that the regime is in a crisis of overthrow. Given these consequences, why did Khamenei follow a path that would lead to war and cause him to face such a crisis?

Ehsan Aminroaya
The explanation I want to offer is, in principle, an opposition to the premise of this question. There has been a displacement here. Look, it’s not that the regime entered this phase of overthrow because it entered this war. On the contrary, it opened the doors to war because it was under the threat of overthrow.

Khamenei and his intelligence apparatus certainly knew that Israel was preparing for an attack. For a long time, Israeli military and intelligence officials had been hinting at this issue in public. The fact that the regime was surprised on the first day of the attack was tactical in nature. It was deceived about the exact day the attack would happen. But it was generally aware that such an attack was on its way, especially since it had clashed with Israel four times in the past year.
Therefore, Khamenei could have moved in another direction that would have closed the path to war, but he did not do so.

Now we can raise a series of questions:
Why, in the five rounds of negotiations Khamenei had with the United States, did he not act in a way that would close the path to war?
Why, while having one hundred thousand forces in Syria, could he not hold Syria?
Why on October 7, 2023—the day of the Hamas attack on Israel—did he light the fire of that war when it was a war with Israel, the United States, and the Western world, and its strategic consequences were not a hidden matter?
Why, in March 2023, did Khamenei announce that from now on he would activate what he calls the “axis of resistance,” and then his proxy forces in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon began to attack US and Israeli forces?
Why did he push the Hezbollah group, which was one of the regime’s own strategic survival reserves, into a war when it was clear it would be destroyed?

Well, these questions can be continued. And when there are so many questions, we can no longer attribute Khamenei’s actions to a tactical oversight or a miscalculation.
Rather, we must pay attention to the single dynamic that has been and still is behind all these decisions and actions. That dynamic is that Khamenei, from day one, has tried to escape from the uprising of the Iranian people. To prevent the re-emergence of the uprising, he turns to war. We must say with absolute certainty that if the uprisings of the autumn of 2022 had not happened, Khamenei would not have stepped on this path and would not have opened the doors to war in this way.

Question 10: We will dedicate the remaining time to the last question: After the war, the regime started propaganda and claims about victory, from Khamenei himself to the Friday prayer leaders and the rest, they are saying these things. Why have they resorted to this tactic when now even the regime’s Basijis don’t believe it?

Ehsan Aminroaya
Well, these words are not worthy of attention.
Let’s look at the entire political scene from above:
Any assessment of the regime’s position and its policies is strictly under the influence of two fundamental realities:

First, the regime is stuck in the swamp of war. Getting out of this swamp has a heavy price, whether it wants to surrender, continue the war, or wants to drag out the current situation. The first case means the loss of Khamenei’s hegemony, which is the closest path to overthrow. The second, as we saw in those 12 days, is not within the regime’s capacity and endurance. And the third is opening the doors to an uprising.

But the other fundamental reality is that Khamenei’s strategy has failed. That strategy which was built on Hezbollah of Lebanon, dominance over Syria, and the nuclear program. This pillar no longer remains for the regime.

Question 11: But some say parts of the nuclear project are still salvageable and the regime can start again.

Ehsan Aminroaya
The war that occurred has transformed the framework for assessing the nuclear program. The issue is not how little or how much of the sites and facilities of the regime or its reserves of 60% uranium remain. The issue is that the nuclear program itself has become a challenge to the regime’s existence. Are large parts of the regime’s nuclear program still intact and untouched? Or have large parts of it been completely destroyed? The answer to this question is no longer decisive. What is decisive is that the existential property of this program, which was supposed to guarantee the regime’s survival, has been lost and has found a reverse function.

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